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Tunisia's Insurance  Sector  Oespiteanewmodern
insurance  code  that fosters
competition and  solvency
Dimitri  Vittas  monitoring,  Tunisia's
insurance  sector  is
underdeveloped.  What  it
especially  needs is  the
restructuring  and re-
capitalization  of capita-
deficient  companies,  radical
reform  of the social  pension
system,  and stronger
supervision  of the  Industry.
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Summary  findings
The main economic functions of the insurance sector are  In recent years there has been a growing trend away
to cover financial risk and to mobilize long-term savings.  from direct controls  on premiums, products, and
The sector can also play an important role in developing  investments, and toward more monitoring  of the
the private sector and modernizing the securities market.  solvency of companies, through more effective
But to play its economic and financial roles, the  supervision and clear prudential controls.
insurance sector must operate within a framework of  Vittas argues that Tunisia's insurance sector has been
stable, liberal regulation that provides incentives for  hampered by restrictive regulations, by the country's  low
efficiency, allows companies to innovate, and creates a  incomes (which limit long-term savings capabilities), and
contestable market with relatively free entry and exit.  by its pay-as-you-go social pension system. Tunisia's life
In most developing countries, regulation has deviated  insurance is seriously underdeveloped.
greatly from this ideal. Often dominated by state-owned  The insurance industry also suffers from structural
companies, the insurance industry in many developing  problems. Worst of all, prudential regulations and
countries features:  standards are unequally applied, and some companies are
* Strict controls on new entry.  still operating with insufficient capital (in a few cases,
* Prohibitions against majority ownership by foreign  with greatly negative equity).
companies.  What is needed? Capital-deficient companies need to
* Fixed premiums (especially for compulsory lines).  be restructured and recapitalized, state-owned companies
* Prior approval of tariff changes and new products.  need to be privatized, and the market needs to be opened
* High local retention ratios (which discourage  up to majority foreign-owned firms. Supervision must be
reinsurance from overseas companies).  strengthened and corrective measures applied more
I  insurance reserves used as a captive source of  equitably and forcefully. The social pension system must
funding for public deficits.  be radically reformed, to include one fully funded pillar
* Weak prudential controls and inadequate  that will generate long-term savings and transform the
monitoring of solvency.  prospects for life insurance business.
This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Development Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to
study pension funds and insurance companies. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Priscilla Infante, room G8-118, extension 37642 (25 pages). May 1995.
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Dimitri  Vittas1.  INTRODUCTION
The insurance sector can play a very important part in the development of the private sector and
the  modernization  of  the  securities  markets.  By  covering  economic  and  financial  risks,  it enables
enterprises to better manage their financial affairs and protects households from the financial losses arising
from accidents and injuries.  In addition, the industry, especially the life insurance sector, mobilizes long-
term savings that can facilitate the financing of both enterprises and households with resources that have
a much longer maturity than traditional loans from the banking sector.
In orcder  to play  its economic and financial role,  the insurance sector requires a framework  of
stable  and  liberal regulation  that  provides adequate  incentives for  efficiency  and  allows  individual
companies to innovate.  Insurance regulation must aim at creating a contestable market that is open to new
entry by qLialified  companies and facilitates the exit of insolvent firms.  It must also aim at safeguarding
the stabilitv  of the  sector and the solvency of  individual companies  and at  protecting the  interests of
policyholders.
In most developing countries, insurance regulation has traditionally  involved some or all  of the
following':  domination by state owned companies; strict controls on new entry; prohibition of majority
ownership by foreign companies; fixing of premiums (especially for compulsory lines); prior approval of
tariff  changes and new products; discouragement of reinsurance with overseas companies through high
local retention ratios; use of insurance reserves as a captive source for funding public sector deficits; and
weak application  of solvency monitoring  and  prudential  controls.  In  recent years,  there  has been  a
growing trend away from direct controls on premiums, products and investments and a greater reliance
on solvency monitoring of individual companies, involving a combination of clear prudential controls and
effective supervision.
This paper discusses the structure, regulation and prospects of the insurance industry in Tunisia.
It complements earlier work on the options for pension refonn  in Tunisia (Vittas  1993c) and forms part
of  ongoing  work  on  the  promotion  of contractual  savings  and  institutional  investors  in developing
countries anci on their contribution to the development of the capital markets 2.
HI.  THE  INSURANCE  INDUSTRY IN TUNISIA
Reflecting  the relatively low  level of income and the  restrictive regulation of the market,  the
development of the Tunisian insurance industry has been rather slow. The sector appears to have suffered
from the structural adjustment of the economy that has been under way since the mid 1980s.  The growth
rate of insurance premiums has decelerated considerably in recent years: the level of premiums in relation
to GDP  has fallen  from  1.75% in  1986 to  1.60% in  1990, but recovered to  1.72% of GDP  by  1993.
1  Insuranice policies  in developing countries  have been  analyzed by Skipper  (1987),  Outreville
(1990.  1992 and  1994) and Vittas and Skully (1991), while UNCTAD (1990) and Sigma (1994) have
collected statistics on  insurance in developing countries.
See Vittas and Skullv (1991), Vittas (1992, 1993a, 1993b and 1993c), Wright (1992), Vittas and
Iglesias (1992), Grace and Barth (1993), World Bank (1994), Mclsaac (1995), and Mcisaac and Babbel
(1995).
IInsurance  penetration  in Tunisia lags  behind  several  countries  at a similar level of income  and  economic
development  (Table 1). The growth of insurance  has  been  held back  by several  structural  problems.
The Tunisian insurance  industry has  long been  subject  to restrictive  regulations  that have limited
its ability  to engage  in technical risk and financial management. Several of the companies  report
cumulative  deficits  that exceed  their authorized  capital  and  thus  operate  with negative  equity. In fact, the
capital shortfalls  of these  companies  exceed  the capital  of all the other companies  so that the industry  as
a whole suffers from negative  equity.  The compulsory  personal  lines are in chronic deficit, while the
returns  on financial investments  have  been  suppressed  by the low yields on government  securities  as  well
as on the equities in which insurance  companies  have  invested  their technical  reserves. Insurance  also
suffers from a large  tax burden,  especially  on the premiums  paid in some  lines of business.
Tahfe 1
International Comparison of Insurance Premiums,  1992
(percent of GDP)
Africa  Asia  Latin America
South  Africa  12.8  China  1.0  Brazil  4.3
Zimbabwe  4.8  Korea  12.3  Panama  3.3
Kenya  2.4  Japan  8.6  Chile  3.0
Morocco  2.1  Taiwan  4.8  Venezuela  2.2
Tunisia  1.7  Malaysia  3.8  Uruguay  2.0
Singapore  3.7  Colombia  1.8
Philippines  2.3  Argentina  1.6
Thailand  2.0  Mexico  1.5
Source:  Sigma, World Insurance  in 1992,  Swiss  Reinsurance  Company,  3/94.
The adverse  effects  of premium regulation  in some  lines have  been  compounded  by ill-advised
competition for market share  in others. Companies  that are better managed  and are more aware  of the
costs  of different coverages  are often undermined  by the low premiums  offered by companies  with weak
capital base or less sophisticated  management. The industry also suffers from  widespread  mistrust
between  insurers  and the insured,  which is aggravated  by the lack of adequate  information and by the
weakness  of controls against  moral hazard  and inflated loss  claims.  To contain  costs,  the industry has
often engaged  in delaying  tactics  and disputes  with loss  claimants. This has  contributed  to its negative
public image and has fueled the mistrust betveen insurers  and insured,  especially  in the compulsory
automobile  line.
To improve  inatters.  there  is a strong  need  for a reform of regulation,  strengthening  of supervision,
recapitalization  and  restructuring  of capital-deficient  companies,  privatization  of state-owned  companies.
modernization  of financial management  to enhance  the investment  performance  of insurance  companies.
intensive  training programs  for both  regulators  and  market  practitioners,  and  a major  campaign  to improve
the public inage of the industrv.
2Structure of the Tunisian Market
The Tunisian market comprises 22 companies.  Of these,  II  engage in multi-branch operations,
4 are single branch companies (2 specialize in life insurance, I in export insurance and  I in reinsurance)
and  7 arc  off-shore companies  authorized to  conduct operations  w th  nonresidents.  In terms of legal
status, 5 of the  15 resident companies are state-owned 3, 7 are set up as joint  stock companies (societes
anonymes)  and  3  are  mutual  companies.  Excluding two  state-owned  companies  that  specialize  in
reinsurance  and export insurance, the business of the remaining 13 companies is structured as shown in
Table 2.
Table 2
Market Structure,  1990 and 1993
1990  1993
PREMIUMS  %  PREMIUMS  %
(MD)  (MD)
STAR  62.1  36.0  86.8  33.2
EL ITTIHAD  13.4  7.8  24.4  9.3
LLOYD TUNISIEN  8.3  4.8  11.7  4.5
PUBLIC SECTOR  83.8  48.9  122.1  47.1
GAT  20.1  11.6  30.3  11.6
COMAR  17.9  10.4  30.4  11.6
ASTREE  14.9  8.6  20.6  7.9
MAGHREBIA  11.3  6.5  20.5  7.8
CARTE  8.4  4.9  12.7  4.9
HAYETT  0.7  0.4  2.0  0.8
AMINA  0.8  0.5  1.1  0.4
PRIVATE SECTOR S.A.  74.1  42.9  117.6  45.0
CTAMA (Agricultural)  7.6  4.4  10.8  4.1
MGA (Agricultural)  4.1  2.4  5.6  2.1
MAE (Teachers)  3.1  1.8  4.3  1.6
PRIVATE SECTOR MUTUAL  14.8  8.6  20.7  7.9
TOTAL  172.8  100.0  261.2  100.0
CONCENTRATION C3  100.1  58.0  147.5  56.5
HHI  1789  1654
Source:  Ministry of Finance, Direction Generale des Assurances and F.TU.S.A.
El Ittihad, which is owned by the trade unions, is officially classified as a mutual company.  In
practice, however,  it appears to be heavily supported by capital  injections or at the very  least implicit
guarantees  from the state.
3Insurance companies  must be established  under Tunisian law and must be majority owned by
Tunisian interests.  Four of the resident companies  have extensive foreign participation. ranging between
44% and 48%,  although this  is in most cases  divided between 2 or more companies.  Divided minority
foreign participation  implies relatively small stakes and limited managerial involvement.  This results in
fewer benefits for the  local companies  concerned  in terms of transfer of financial technology,  product
innovation. and enhanced risk and  investment management.
Table 3
Insurance Premiums by Line, 1990 and 1993
1990  1993
PREMIUMS  %  PREMIUMS  %
(MD)  (MD)
MOTOR  55.5  32.8  83.8  32.8
GROUP HEALTH  33.3  19.7  52.3  20.5
TRANSPORT  18.6  11.0  25.0  9.8
FIRE  17.0  10.1  24.1  9.4
WORK ACCIDENT  16.4  9.7  22.1  8.6
MISCELLANEOUS  16.2  9.6  32.4  12.7
LIFE  12.0  7.1  15.9  6.2
TOTAL DIRECT  169.0  100.0  255.6  100.0
ACCEPTED REINSURANCE  3.8  5.6
TOTAL PREMIUMS  172.8  261.2
Source:  Ministry of Finance, Direction Generale des Assurances and F.TU.S.A.
The insurance industry is dominated by state owned companies,  which account for 47% of total
1993 premiums (based on the 13 resident companies that engage in ordinary life and/or nonlife business).
The share of state-owned companies has suffered a slight fall in recent years.  State-owned companies
used  to enjoy a strong preference by state entities and other state-owned companies but in recent years
there has been a gradual defection of public sector business to private companies, which appear to charge
higher premiums but offer a better service.
Market concentration  is quite  high as the three  largest companies control almost  57% of the
market (Table 2).  The Herfindahl index of concentration was 1654 in 1993. down from  1789 in  1990.
This is close  to the limit of 1800 used by US authorities in blocking mergers for anticompetitive reasons 4.
The small decline in the index reflects the gain of market share by the two private companies among the
big three  insurers at  the expense of the largest company, which  is state owned.  It  is notable that  El
4  As the experience  of  Canada. the  Netherlands and  other  high  income countries  shows,  high
concentration  per  se is not incompatible  with competitive  efficiency  if  the market  is contestable  by
potential  new  entrants.  In  most developing  countries,  it  is the  combination  of  high  concentration,
dominant state ownership and restrictive regulations that tends to have adverse effects on the degree of
competition,  innovation and overall efficiency.
4Ittihad,  a company  with a large  negative  equity, increased  significantly  its market share between 1990  and
1993. This company mostly  engages in automobile  and group health insurance.  two of the loss making
lines. The increase in market share may be expalined  by a policy of underpricing. But given the large
negative  equity and the low coverage  of reserves,  its customers  either suffer from an illusion  of insurance
or they rely on the implicit backing of the state.
The compulsory personal lines of insurance,  which include third party automobile and work
accident,  account  for over 40% of total business  (Table  3). Group  health insurance  represents  about 20%,
while  transportation,  fire and miscellaneous  risks,  which tend to be large industrial  and commercial  risks,
account for about one third of total premiums. Life insurance  is poorly developed  and represents  only
6% of the total.  Most life insurance is linked to bank loans and, though not imposed  by the state, is
effectively compulsory for borrowers.  As discussed further below, the existence of social security
probably  crowds  out the purchase  of life insurance.
Table 4
Structure of Insurance Business in Selected Countries, 1992
(percent of total premiums)
Life  Nonlife
Africa
South Africa  80.5  19.5
Zimbabwe  60.4  39.6
Kenya  20.8  79.2
Morocco  19.0  81.0
Tunisia  6.0  94.0
East Asia
South Korea  79.7  20.3
Taiwan (China)  68.8  31.2
Singapore  62.2  37.8
Philippines  60.9  39.1
Thailand  55.0  45.0
Malaysia  44.7  55.3
Indonesia  30.0  70.0
China  30.0  70.0
Latin America
Chile  60.0  40.0
Mexico  33.3  66.7
Colombia  22.2  77.8
Argentina  12.5  87.5
Brazil  11.6  88.4
Source: Sigma, Swiss Reinsurance  Company,  3/94.
The relative underdevelopment  of the insurance  industry in Tunisia is shown  by the low share of
life business  in total premiums  (Table 4).  This is much lower than the corresponding  share in Morocco
5and  Kenya,  let alone  in East Asian countries.  Tunisia's share is even lower than that of high inflation
countries in Latin America.
Reinsurance plays a big part in the large industrial and commercial risks, where ceded premiums
amount  to between 60% and  70% of gross premiums.  Reinsurance is less important in personal lines.
Tunis Re, the state-owned local company, absorbs about 20% of ceded premiums, while the rest is placed
with international reinsurance groups.
The Distribution  System
Insurance companies employ well over 2,500 people, but for the distribution of their products they
also use a network of about 360 insurance brokers.  Most of these brokers are tied to individual companies
and sell the products of these companies only.  The largest networks are held by the  largest companies.
There are also 4 companies of independent brokers that are not tied to any individual company but sell
the products of all companies and  15 agents authorized to sell life insurance, capitalization policies and
annuities.
The insurance brokerage part of the market suffers from a number of problems.  Agents are not
always professionally qualified or trained and, as in other countries, they  often use aggressive selling
techniques that do not always take into account the best interests of consumers.  It is for this reason that
the recently introduced new insurance code has specified minimum qualification requirements for brokers
and selling agents and has also stipulated the use of detailed procedures and forns  to protect consumers.
Another  problem  with  insurance  brokers  has  resulted  from  lax  financial  controls  of  some
companies, especially the state-owned ones.  Insurance brokers have been allowed to accumulate large
amounts of premiums that have been collected from customers but not transferred over to the companies
concerned.  This has inflated the claims of insurance companies on their agents and, in some cases, when
action to recover those claims was taken, insurance agents were unable to meet their obligations causing
losses for the companies concerned.
The insurance industry also employs about 50 experts for  motor insurance claims and 21  loss
adjusters. who specialize in particular in adjusting claims arising from international transport insurance.
Underwriting  Performance
Efficiency in the insurance industry is difficult to measure because, like all other types of financial
services. there is no easy definition of the output of the sector.  Various measures are used for comparative
purposes but these are subject to considerable subjectivity that substantially reduces their usefulness.
Nonlifc  Insurance.  In nonlife business, underwriting performance  is measured by four  basic
ratios: the loss ratio, the expense ratio, the combined ratio and the operating ratio.
The  loss ratio  measures  claims  paid  and  provisions  for  losses incurred  but  not  settled as  a
proportion  of retained premiums.  i.e. gross premiums received less premiums  ceded to reinsurers.  It
shows the percentage of premiums that are paid back to the insured, a high ratio normally indicates an
efficicnt  and competitive  industry.  But because payments for losses may be spread over a number of
years,  especially for  so-called long tail business, such as automobile insurance where claims may take
several years to  settle,  insurance  companies make transfers to  loss reserves to cover  future payments.
6Differences  in reserving  policies and manipulation of reserves  for  sax and  other purposes reduce the
usefulness of the loss ratio as an index of efficiency.  Nevertheless, a low ratio would  indicate relative
inefficiency.
The expense ratio is computed as general expenses and net commissions paid (i.e. commissions
paid to agents less commissions received from reinsurers) as a proportion of gross premiums 5. It provides
a  measure  of the  acquisition  costs  of  insurance business.  A  high expense ratio  would  suggest  low
operating  efficiency  in  marketing  and  product  innovation  and  in  processing  claims  as  well  as  an
uncompetitive  distribution system.
The combined ratio, which is often used as a measure of the underwriting profitability of insurance
companies, is the sum of the loss and expense ratios 6. Finally, the operating ratio also takes account of
the investment income earned on loss reserves.  It is obtained by deducting investment income as a ratio
of retained premiums from the combined ratio.
Traditionally, nonlife insurance companies aimed to operate with a combined ratio of 95% and
earn a 5% profit on their premiums withiout  taking account of iivestment  income.  With an average ratio
of premiums over equity of 3, this resulted in a satisfactory return on equity of 15%.  But high inflation
and  high  nominal  rates  of  investment  returns  as well  as a  growing  level  of reserves  in  relation  to
premiums  forced insurance companies to take account of investment income on reserves and to engage
in what has become known as cash flow underwriting.  When investment income is high as a proportion
of premiums, insurance companies may lower premiums in relation to expected losses and the combined
ratio may exceed 100%, giving rise to an underwriting loss.  This is made up from the investment income
earned on reserves.
International comparisons of nonlife insurance results are complicated by differences in accounting
conventions,  market structure, business mix,  inflation rates, and data coverage.  Differences in business
or product mix are particularly important because both acquisition costs and loss claims vary significantly
across different  lines.  In most countries, automobile insurance operates with very high combined ratios,
because premiums tend to be regulated, while expenses and losses are high.  In contrast, the fire contract
is almost everywhere associated with low loss ratios.  In some cases, this reflects the biases of the official
tariffs that for political purposes involve a considerable amount of cross subsidization across different lines
and tend  to  keep motor premiums  low and fire premiums  high.  But even in countries with  no tariff
controls,  fire premiums  are generally high.  Such pricing structures may  reflect a  cartelization of the
industry with leadership pricing and gentlemen's agreements but they could also reflect a lack of price
sensitivity among consumers, especially for household policies'.
5  Gross premiums is used as the basis for calculating the expense ratio because acquisition costs are
incurred for the generation of gross premiums, and not just  retained premiums.
6  It is customary to add the two ratios even though one is based on retained premiums and the other
on gross premiums.
7  The explanation for the generally high fire premiums could be more complicated, although hard
evidence on this  is not readily available.  Insurance companies that lower their fire premiums may  be
attracting  customers  who  are  price  sensitive and  engage  in comparative  shopping.  However, these
customers may be high risk customers, not necessarily in the sense of suffering more fire accidents, but
7In Tunisia. the reported underwriting results of the insurance industry  as a whole have been very
poor for a long period.  The cumulative technical deficits of the industrv. i.e. before taking account of
investment income, have amounted to 50 MD over the four year period 1989-92. These corresponded to
about 25% of annual premiums.  Two compulsory lines. motor insurance (mostlv for third-party claims)
and  work  accident  insurance, accumulated  technical deficits well  in excess of 80  MD over  the same
period.
In 1992, the technical deficit for all lines amounted to  15.9 MD or 9.2% of retained premiums.
As acquisition costs amounted to about 20% of premiums, this implied an overall loss ratio of 89%.  After
allowing  for  investment  income  on  technical  reserves  of  24  MD  (14%  of  premiums)  and  various
provisions  for  precautionary  and  depreciation  reserves, the  industry suffered  a  net  loss of  5.8  MD.
equivalent to 3.4% of premiums.  4 of the companies reported net losses of a total of 10.2 MD, wilile the
remaining 9 companies produced a net profit of 4.4 MD.
These results were obtained after the transfer of substantial amounts to technical reserves for the
coverage of outstanding claims (losses already claimed but to be settled in the future) and for current risks
(i.e.  losses that  have occurred  but have not been claimed).  In Tunisia, technical reserves  for  nonlife
business were about  170% of retained premiums  in  1992.  This is a reasonable  level by international
standards.  It  reflects the  need to maintain adequate reserves  because of  the long delays  in effecting
settlement.  However, reserving,  like provisioning  against nonperforming  loans in banking,  is highly
subjective.  Without rather detailed audits, it is not possible to tell whether Tunisian companies undertake
the right  amount  of reserving,  engage in excess reserving  in order to understate profits and  minimize
corporate taxes, or suffer from deficient reserving in an attempt to bolster profits.  In addition. Tunisian
insurance companies appear to have created rather substantial precautionary reserves, whicih  also allow
considerable room for subjective judgment and manipulation of reported results.
Motor Insurance. In motor insurance, the main problem is the low level of premiums, whicil are
set by the authorities for different classes of cars and the inexorable rise of costs.  Authorized increases
in premiums have been inadequate and have not kept pace with the rising costs of repairs and the size of
court awards in cases of personal injuries or deaths.  A no-claims bonus system was introduced recently,
but the  discounts and  penalties are set out in detail by the authorities.  This prevents companies  from
providing  greater  incentives to attract the better and more responsible drivers.  Insurers would  like to
introduce a "baremization" system that puts upper Ihnits on court awards for personal injuries and loss of
life, similar to those that exist in Spain and Canada.
In general, the motor insurance line suffers from long delays in settling claimis.  lack of clarity and
disputes between insurance companies and claimants, regardinig the extent and severity of damages and
the cost of repairs.  The combined ratio amounted to  133% in 1992, resulting in an underwriting  loss
(technical deficit) of 22.6 MD.  Data from one company indicate that losses arise in third party insuranice
where premiums are too low for the risks involved.  This company reports a combined ratio of 143% for
third  party risks, while the technical result for other motor risks is positivc.
rather  in the sense of kilowinig the "rulebook" and  having a highier tendency to submitting claims and
pursuing  them  more  aggressivelv  than the average customer.  Thus,  lowering fire premiums  may  be
counterproductive  if it is associated withi  higher claims.  This argument is similar to the explanation put
forward  for  the  persistently high  rates of  interest on  credit  cards in an otherwise  highily competitive
industry.
8Work  accident  insurance.  The  problems  in  work  accident  insurance  took  a  different  form.
Companies were free to set their premiums, but there was a tendency to engage in ill advised competition
and to use this line (as well  as group health insurance) as a  loss leader for establishing relations withi
customers, especially  with the larger employers.  In the  case of work accidents,  insurance companies
suffered from the use of master policies that did not specifv by name all the workers covered by them.
Employers tended to under-declare the number of their employees  and to claim indemnities for  those
workers who suffered accidents.  The loss ratio was thus higher than the companies took into account in
setting their premiums.  This line reported an underwriting  loss of 4.2 MD in 1992, equivalent to 22%
of premiums.
Lack of data on loss experience and ineffective monitoring as well as long disputes regarding the
severity of injuries aggravated the situation.  Insurance companies have been pressing for the introduction
of nominal policies, which would record by name all the workers covered by particular policies, but the
government decided to transfer work accident insurance to the social security funds as of the beginning
of 1995.  The Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale (CNSS) has adopted a more aggressive stance against
enterprises that are late in paying social security contributions and has the relevant database to ensure that
nominal policies are effectively used for work accident coverage.
But transferring  work accident  insurance to the  public sector goes against the recent trend  of
greater reliance on the private sector.  Moreover, there are concerns among private sector employers that
the change may be motivated by the need to  increase the revenues of the social security funds with  a
simultaneous reduction in effective coverage and benefits.
The problems faced by the work accident insurance line are typical of an insurance sector that is
inadequately capitalized and ineffectively regulated.  The answer to these problems is not the transfer of
business to a state monopoly supplier but the  introduction of more effective prudential regulations and
solvency monitoring that will both prevent companies from charging very low premiums and force them
to monitor better the use of insurance coverage by their customers.  The appeal by private companies to
the government  for the  legal imposition of nominal policies is indicative both of the weakness of the
financial and technical management function in the private sector and of the ineffectiveness of corrective
measures.  As discussed further below, the regulatory authorities have put in place a reasonably effective
system of monitoring,  reporting and  inspection.  What seems to  be  lacking is a forceful  and  equal
application of solvency standards and corrective measures.
Group health insurance. Like work accident insurance, group health insurance has also generated
negative  results,  mainly  because  it has been  used as a  loss leader.  The  underwriting  loss in  1992
amounted to 3.5 MD or 8% of retained premiums.  This line appears to suffer less from disputes with the
insured.  Several companies indicate that claims are settled with very short delays (generally less than two
weeks).  The competition with the health insurance services provided by the social security funds may be
a factor explaining the better service offered by private companies in this line.
Some of the better run private companies report gains in this  line of business, despite charging
higher premiums than state-owned companies.  In some cases, state entities or state controlled enterprises
have transferred their group health insurance to private sector companies.
Other risks. Fire, transport and miscellaneous risks produce positive underwriting results, which
are very  high in the case of fire insurance.  But insurance companies tend to cede a  big part of large
industrial risks to Tunis Re and foreign reinsurance companies and thus they benefit less from the superior
9performance  of  these  lines.  The  combined  ratio for  these  lines was only  55%  in  1992, giving  an
underwriting profit of 45% of retained premiums.  This was unusually higih.  In 1990, the underwriting
profit amounted to  15% of premiums.
Life insurance.  The life business is not well developed for several reasons.  First, the low level
of income and wealth of the vast majority of the population has reduced the affordability  of long-term
saving.  Second, the existence of a social security system offering generous pensions to both employees
of the public sector (civil servants and public utilities) and private sector employees (especially employees
of  banks,  other  financial  institutions  and  large  industrial  firms)  has  weakened  the  demand  for  life
insurance.  Third, the returns on life insurance policies have been quite low as a result of the restrictive
investment regulations (see below)  And, fourth, life insurance has not benefitted from fiscal incentives
as in other developing countries that have experienced high growth in life insurance.  The prospects for
life insurance are very likely to improve substantially in the future if the pension system is reformed and
a capitalization pillar is established to complement the existing partially funded, defined benefit first pillar.
In life insurance, the concept of the loss ratio has less meaning, as it would include only claims
paid due  to death or maturity of contract.  For a growing  industry, the loss ratio would be quite  low
because a substantial part of premiums is placed in reserves to cover the long-term liabilities inherent in
life policies.  If benefits and dividends paid to policyholders and additions to technical reserves are treated
as representing the premiums paid back to policyholders in the long run, then this pay-back ratio could
be a better measure of efficiency for life insurance business than the loss ratio.  In Tunisia, the pay-back
ratio amounted to 58% of premiums in  1992.  Expenses absorbed  17% and commissions another 7%,
leaving an underwriting profit of 18%.
Reinsurance
Unlike many other developing countries, especially in Latin America (prior to the recent wave of
reform) and Africa, the reinsurance market in Tunisia is not dominated by a large state-owned monopoly
to whicih  all companies are required to cede a large proportion of their business.  In countries like Brazil
and Argentina,  such state-owned reinsurance monopolies had a disastrous experience and were forced
eventiually to be liquidated.
In Tun1isia.  insurance companies  are required to  cede locally 20% of  their premiums  but are
othervise  free to  enter  into  treaties  with approved  foreign  companies.  Some  lines of  business are
reinsured up to 60% or 70% of premiums.  Most of that business is ceded to foreign companies that often
have some direct or indirect ownership  link with the ceding companies.
In  many  developing  countries,  access to  international  reinsurance  markets  has  provided  an
excellent itleanls  of technical and professional training for staff since foreign reinsurance companies prefer
to have to deal witli knowledgeable individuals and thus lower their transaction costs.  Concerns about
excessive reliance oni reinsurance can be addressed by using solvency margins based on average retained
claims as well as on retained premiums. but subject to the use of a minimum retention ratio of 50% for
the calculation of solvencv margins.
Investment Performance
Insurance companies build up substantial technical reserves, which are available  for investment
in long-term and marketable  finanicial  instruments.  Even nonlife companies that cover relatively short-
10term  risks  accumulate  substantial reserves  which, despite the  short-term  nature of  the  risks covered,
represent long-term resources for companies that experience a reasonably steady growth in their business.
In fact, because the loss claims facing nonlife insurance companies suffer from various processing delays
until they are settled and are thus exposed to the vagaries of inflation,  nonlife insurance companies  in
OECD countries, especially in Anglo-American countries, tend to place a high proportion of their technical
reserves  in corporate  equities that  generally provide a  better  hedge against inflation than  bonds.  The
reserves of life insurance and annuities business are of a long term nature and are generally  invested in
long term assets.
Since the life insurance sector is not well developed, most of the reserves of insurance companies
represent reserves for nonlife general insurance business.  Total reserves amounted in  1993 to 455 MD,
up  from 324.5  MD in  1990.  They correspond to  3.1% of GDP.  Admitted assets, i.e. assets that are
recognized for reserving purposes, cover 78% of technical reserves 8. There are two main reasons for the
deficiency of admitted assets: the excessive level of claims on brokers and agents, which are not admitted
if they are outstanding for more than three months and exceed 10% of premiums; and the accumulated
losses of four out of the  13 companies.  As discussed below, there is significant variation in the financial
condition of different companies and, although no detailed data are published, it is likely that the coverage
of reserves also varies significantly from company to company.  The capital deficient companies  in the
public and mutual sectors are likely to have low to very low coverage of their reserves.
About  50% of admitted assets are  invested in government  bonds (Table  5).  Another  17% is
represented by equities,  11%  by property securities, and  14% by liquid money market assets.  In the past
equipment bonds were earning a below market rate of interest, but in recent years government bonds are
issued on  close to market terms and conditions.  Some of the equity holdings are, however,  very low
yielding  shares in other state-owned enterprises.  The big increase in property investments reflects the
tendency of many of the private sector companies to build or acquire offices for own use as well for rental
purposes.
Table 5
Composition of Admitted Assets, 1990 and  1993
1990  1993
MD  %  MD  %
Government  bonds  132.2  57.0  177.2  49.7
Shares  37.0  16.0  62.5  17.5
Property  24.6  10.6  40.3  11.3
Liquid assets  24.1  10.4  48.3  13.5
Other  admitted assets  13.8  6.0  28.7  8.0
Total  231.7  100.0  357.0  100.0
Source:  Ministry of Finance, Direction Generale des Assurances
8  To ensure the solvency of insurance companies, insurance regulators do not admit for prescribed
regulatorv  ratios  assets that  do  not  meet certain  criteria.  For  instance, excess  claims  on  agents  for
premiums  receivable, above a specified threshold, are not counted among admitted assets.
11The  return  on  admitted  assets  is generally  quite  poor,  although there  has  been  considerable
improvement in recent years.  The reported average return is below 7% and has risen slightly over the past
few years.  However, insurance companies have made significant unrealized capital gains in their holdings
of listed equities and in their property investments.
Financial  Condition
The financial condition of the Tunisian insurance industry as a whole is very poor.  However, the
private companies  appear to  be in  reasonably strong financial  position (at  least on the  basis  of their
reported but unaudited results), while two public sector companies -- El Ittihad and Lloyd Tunisien --
suffer from a serious capital deficiency and a persistent accumulation of losses.  DGA data for  1992 show
that cumulative  losses suffered by  four companies (the above plus two mutual companies) amounted to
57.9 MD.  These exceeded the total paid up capital and reserves of the industry, which amounted to 52.5
MD.  Thus, the industry as a whole operated in  1992 with a negative equity of 5.4 MD (Table 6).  This
represented a small improvement over 1990 when accumulated losses amounted to 44.9 MD, the reported
total equity of the industry was 38.1 MD and the overall shortfall was 6.8 MD.  The private companies,
the state-owned STAR and the three mutual companies reported positive equity.  But in the case of STAR
and the mutual companies, the level of equity was well below the required solvency standards imposed
by the new insurance code.
Table 6
Aggregate Balance Sheet of Insurance Industry, 1992
Assets  MD  %
Government  Bonds  147.1  24.8
Equities  49.5  8.3
Properties  33.0  5.6
Liquid Assets  59.6  10.0
Personal Loans  2.9  0.5
Claims on Reinsurers  67.2  11.3
Premiums Receivable  86.1  14.5
Other Assets  90.9  15.3
Cumulative Losses (4 cos)  57.9*  9.7
Total  594.2  100.0
Liabilities
Equity  48.3*  8.1
Insurance Reserves  412.9  69.5
Due to Reinsurers  45.9  7.7
Due to Government  37.5  6.3
Other Liabilities  49.6  8.4
Total  594.2  100.0
*  The industry as a whole has a negative net equity because of the large cumulative
losses of four companies.
Source:  Ministry of Finance, Direction Generale des Assurances
12It should also be noted that the reported equitv of some companies may be overstated, because
among other things the level of claims on agents is excessively high.  On the basis of admitted assets only,
the financial condition of state-owned companies and perhaps also of the mutual companies is likely to
be much worse.  On the other hand, several companies have built up substantial precautionary reserves
and  have  also accumulated  unrealized  capital  gains.  Thus,  the true  financial  condition  of  different
companies is difficult to ascertain.
Table  7 shows that three of the private insurance companies (CARTE, ASTREE and COMAR)
had very strong financial ratios in 1992, with solvency margins over gross premiums well in excess of the
prescribed  20%,  even  stronger  solvency margins over retained  premiums,  and very  healthy equity  to
reserves ratios (the prescribed  level for the last ratio is 10%).  Maghrebia and GAT were closer to the
prescribed norms, while the STAR was well below the required levels, though considerable progress was
achieved in 1992 and is likely to have been continued in  1993 and 1994.  Nevertheless, STAR continues
to face serious restructuring and recapitalization problems.  Needless to stress, the situation is very critical
for the two capital deficient companies, which reported a negative equity of well over 50 MD.
Table 7
Solvency Margins and Capital Strength, 1992
ASSETS  SMGP  SMRP  EQRES  RESPREM
GAT  62.0  16.6  20.6  9.9  168.3
COMAR  74.1  37.3  47.5  17.3  215.9
ASTREE  59.8  39.9  53.2  18.4  217.0
MAGHREBIA  30.4  21.0  32.4  15.2  137.7
CARTE  31.9  66.4  98.6  23.9  163.4
TOTAL FIVE  258.2  32.6  43.8  17.7  184.0
STAR  174.4  6.1  8.7  4.2  159.4
SMGP:  Solvency margin over gross premium - prescribed norm 20%
SMRP:  Solvency margin over retained premiums - EU solvency margin 18% to  16%
EQRES:  Equity over technical reserves - prescribed norm 10%
RESPREM:  Reserves over premiums
Source:  Ministry of Finance, Direction Generale des Assurances and Company Annual Reports
III.  REGULATORY AND MARKET REFORM
To  enhance  its efficiency,  expand  its role  in the  development  of the  securities markets,  and
increase  its contribution  to the promotion of the private sector, the Tunisian insurance sector needs to
undergo fundamental regulatory and market reform.  This would require a partial, yet significant, reform
of the recently introduced insurance code.  But by far the most important change would need to be a more
effective enforcement of corrective measures, especially with regard to the capital deficient companies and
to companies that fail to meet the prescribed prudential norms.
13The following measures would need to be considered:
Insurance supervision
*  strengthening  of  insurance  supervision,  including  a  more  forceful  and  equal  application  of
corrective measures;
Market structure
*  restructuring and recapitalization of capital-deficient companies;
*  privatization of state-owned companies;
*  opening of the Tunisian market to foreign competition;
Regulatory reform
*  rationalization of solvency margins;
*  liberalization of motor insurance premiums and possible introduction of "baremization";
*  rationalization of the tax treatment of insurance premiums;
Training
*  enhancement of financial and technical risk management; and
*  extensive  training  programs  for  regulators  and  market  practitioners,  including  actuaries,
accountants, auditors, investment managers, marketing specialists and agents.
Strengthening  Insurance Supervision and Enforcement of Prudential Rules
The liberalization of the insurance market and encouragement of greater competition presuppose
for their success a stronger and more effective system of supervision.  The insurance authorities already
have the required knowledge and expertise to monitor the performance of insurance companies.  What is
needed is perhaps greater automation of the surveillance system and more extensive and frequent on-site
inspections.  Currently,  insurance supervision suffers from  inadequate levels of staffing, which seem to
be related  to the  low compensation packages compared to market  practice.  A major  effort would be
necessary  to  recruit  and  train  professional examiners,  while  the  possibility  of  creating  an insurance
regulatory agency that is outside the standard civil service payscale could also be considered.
But the most important problem seems to be the inability of insurance supervisors to enforce the
prudential norms.  A more forceful and equal application of corrective measures is essential.  This should
ensure that the prudential regulations are observed by all insurance companies and no company is allowed
to  operate with  deficient  capital,  both  in relation  to the  premiums  charged  and  in  relation to  losses
suffered.
Restructuring and Recapitalization of Capital-Deficient Companies
As noted above several companies have long operated with negative equity.  These companies
belong to the public and mutual sectors, a situation that is probably explained by the weak position of
supervisory authorities vis-a-vis  state-owned companies and mutual companies that  are akin to  public
sector entities.  In fact, restoring the capital strength of capital deficient companies is among the corrective
measures proposed by the DGA, but the budget constraints faced by the state have prevented an injection
of new capital.  In addition, although the supervisory authorities have raised in steps the minimum capital
of insurance companies  from  I million to 2 million and more recently to 3 million dinars, state owned
companies  were still operating with a paid up capital of less than 2 million dinars.
14A  contestable market  implies not only relatively free entry that would force  existing firms to
behave competitively but also effective mechanisms for exit if companies become technically insolvent.
The  continuing  operation  of  capital-deficient  companies  undermines the  competitive  ability  of  well
capitalized companies and may also lead to lower standards in the sense that such companies may offer
deceptively  low priced policies with  little intention to settle claims when accidents occur or with little
concern for the effect of losses on their financial condition.  The latter would appear to be true for state-
owned companies, while the former could be the case for small private companies.  Small companies do
not exist  in Tunisia  where the  total  number  of  companies  is rather  small  and  the  minimum  capital
requirement rather high, but state-owned companies with deficient capital do exist and tend to undermine
the competitive ability of better capitalized firms.
Companies that are unable to raise their equity to the required level to meet appropriate solvency
margins should be forced to exit the market either by closing down or by merger with stronger companies.
For state-owned companies, a recapitalization and  restructuring could be linked to their total or partial
privatization.
Privatization of State-Owned Companies
State-owned  companies operate with negative, or at most, deficient equity and appear to suffer
from  low morale.  Their  ability to  compete on  service and  product  innovation is constrained  by  the
shortage of capital and by the limitations on offering attractive remuneration packages and good promotion
prospects to their more dynamic agents and staff.
To prevent the  continuing adverse effect on the  structure of the market from the  existence of
lethargic institutions or institutions that spoil the market through the charging of uneconomic premiums,
the  authorities  should  give  high  priority  to  the  restructuring  and  privatization  of  the  state-owned
companies.  As in other sectors, the role of the state should be limited to that of regulating and supervising
the operations  of private companies, leaving the latter to compete and innovate to better  serve the needs
of their customers.
If there is a need for serving social sectors that the private markets might neglect, then a certain
presence by a state-owned company might be justified.  However, such a company would at most account
for  10% or  15% of the total market, instead of the present dominant share of over 34% held by STAR
and of over 45% by the three companies classified as state-owned in this paper.  It should also be noted
that the role of the public sector in insurance is much greater if account is also taken of the insurance
operations of social security institutions.
International experience shows that public enterprises in any sector are more likely than private
companies to be interfered by politicians.  They are also more likely to delay restructuring and avoid exit
(since they are less likely to be subject to bankruptcy, liquidation, hostile takeover, and closure).  Public
enterprises  are  less  scrutinized  by  the  capital  markets  and  they  are  less well  supervised  by  their
bureaucratic  managers  than  private  firms  which  are  subject to  supervision  by  their  owners  or  by
professional  managers whose careers depend on  the  performance of the companies  they  manage.  In
Tunisia. as in many other developing countries with large state-owned sectors, bureaucratic managers are
often moved around from one company to the next, often in unrelated industries and with little reference
to their past performance.  In many developing countries, state-owned companies have evolved over time
into institutions that exist to serve the interests of their employees rather than those of the state or of their
15customers.  This has often resulted in poor financial performance and poor quality of service, with little
innovation and high costs.
Privatization  of  state-owned insurance companies  would  require detailed  audits  and  actuarial
reviews to ascertain their financial condition and the level of their liabilities to policyholders.  It would
also  require the formulation  of a detailed plan of action that  would aim to restructure  the companies,
remove from their balance sheets any nonperforming assets or insupportable liabilities, and prepare them
for offer to the market.
Opening of the Tunisian Market to Foreign Competition
When Tunisia emerged from the colonial times at the time of its independence, a high priority of
government policy was the Tunisification of various important sectors of industry, commerce and finance
that were traditionally dominated by foreign interests.  This was a historically appropriate response that
had as its main aim the promotion of indigenous forces that would be better tuned to the needs of the
country.  This process was also evident in the insurance sector where foreign companies were either forced
to leave the country or were offered minority participations in companies set up under Tunisian law and
with majority ownership  in Tunisian hands.
However, opening the local market to majority participation  by foreign companies could have
significant benefits for the Tunisian economy.  Foreign companies would be more likely to innovate and
transfer  their financial and insurance technology to the Tunisian market if they had majority ownership
and managerial control of local companies.  Restricting foreign companies to minority participations often
results in small stakes and  limited managerial involvement in the affairs of local companies, other than
attending  periodic board meetings, which often assume a vacational character for the directors involved.
Most developing countries are reluctant to allow foreign banks and insurance companies to enter
their  local markets  for  several reasons.  First,  they are afraid  that  foreign  institutions  may acquire  a
dominant position in the markets.  Second, they are afraid that foreign institutions may engage in "cream
skimming", serving only the most profitable segments of the market.  And, third, they are concerned that
foreign institutions may have a rather weak commitment to the local economy and may depart from a local
market both whieni  prospects in that market are poor and when conditions in their own home market are
unfavorable.  The retrenchment  over the late  1980s of many American banks from European and other
markets, wilicil was partly motivated by the banking crisis and economic recession in the United States,
lends support to this concern.
One  way to  prevent  foreign  institutions from dominating a  local market  would be to  require
ownership of all major participants in a market to be widely dispersed.  This would ensure that no national
bank or insuranice company could be acquired by a foreign financial institution.  A second measure would
be to require all foreign institutions to operate throughi locally established subsidiaries and to offer to the
public a growling part of their equity, depending on their relative size in the market.  A third  alternative
would  be to  encourage joint  ventures with  foreign  institutions  in the  majority position  and  with  the
responsibilitv of managerial control.
Protecting the local market from foreign domination through these measures would allay the fears
of the authorities of most developing countries, while encouraging the entry of foreign  institutions with
superior technology alid management skills.  One of the biggest advantages of allowing foreign institutions
16in a  country  is the training  provided to  local managerial staff,  who  often  leave to manage domestic
institutions.
The Tunisian authorities should give serious consideration to opening the insurance market to more
active foreign entry along the lines suggested above as the financial and technical benefits from doing so
are likely to exceed the political risks of foreign domination, especially if appropriate measures are taken
to prevent  such domination from occurring.
Revision of the Insurance Code
Although recently introduced. the new insurance code, which was issued in March 1992, contains
many provisions that appear to require amendment to make it more consistent with emerging trends in
insurance regulation  in OECD  countries.  However, it is not the objective of this  paper to  provide  a
detailed commentary  and analysis of the insurance code, which  must be undertaken by a team of local
experts representing both the public and private sectors, who would be better informed about the specific
needs of the Tunisian market.
The new code  involved a significant and  commendable modernization  of some aspects of the
conduct of the insurance business.  In particular, the code sought to clarify the responsibility of the insured
to pay the premiums (under the preceding code, insurance companies or their agents were responsible for
the collection of premiums).  It has also introduced the concept of partial and proportional coverage if
insurance contracts are not based on the full market value of the items insured.  This provides a strong
incentive for policyholders to keep the value of their insurance contracts in line with inflation and thus
protects insurance companies from the long-term impact of inflation.
The code also aims to provide greater protection to the buyers of insurance services by requiring
a stronger  professionalism on the part of agents and insisting on the use of formal procedures for the
evaluation of the insurance needs of consumers.  However, the code appears to have imposed ambitiously
high standards and minimum credentials for agents, while the protection of consumer interests has been
sought throughi the use of forms that appear to be bureaucratic and are rather ineffective in protecting
consumers.  The concern of the authorities to raise the professionalism of brokers and salesmen seems to
be fully justified.  However, the pace of  implementation needs to  be aligned with the  circumstances
prevailing in the Tunisian market.  Moreover, the ability of regulators to enforce the new standards must
also be taken into account.
Minimum Capital  Requirements and Solvency Margins
The purpose of a minimum capital requirement is to act as a screening device to ensure that only
companies with some financial standing are allowed to enter the market.  A minimum capital that is set
at too high a level in relation to the projected volume of business will act as a barrier to entry, while a
minimum capital that is too low may cause a fragmentation of the industry with potentially adverse effects
on standards of service and prudence.
The new code increased the minimum capital for multi-line companies to 3 million dinars and for
single  liie  companies  to  I  million dinars.  Also, the required  capital for  mutual companies  is set at
500,000 dinars.  The level of these requirements seems reasonable and in line with standards introduced
in OECD countries.
17The question  of whether there  should  be a  legal requirement  to  engage  in  life  and  nonlife
operations through separately capitalized subsidiaries should be one of the issues to be examinied by the
team of local experts.  In EU countries, it is no longer permitted to authorize composite companies (i.e.
companies that engage in both life and nonlife business).  There are advantages in requiring separately
capitalized subsidiaries, not least in record keeping and reserving policies, while there are few marketing
disadvantages since the selling of life and nonlife business requires different qualifications  and market
knowledge.
The new code also requires a solvency margin that is set at 20% of gross premiums.  This appears
to be rather high by international standards.  It also deviates from the standard definition  used in OECD
countries whereby the solvency margin is related to the level of retained premiums (i.e. gross premiums
less premiums ceded to reinsurers).  The solvency margin is set in the EU at  18% of retained premiums
for the first  10 million  ECU and at  16% for amounts above that level.
But EU regulations also provide for a solvency margin related to average losses paid over a 3 or
7 year period.  This measure is aimed at preventing aggressive companies from charging deceptively low
premiums that bear  little relation to the average level of losses that are incurred in a particular line of
business.  EU provisions set this margin at 26% of annual average claims up to 10 million ECU and 23%
for amounts  above that  level.  A  claims related  solvency margin  provides a  reasonable  inhibition  to
excessive and  ill advised competition  for  purely prudential  purposes and  is a superior  measure to the
traditional fixing of premiums.
The use of gross rather  than retained premiums  aims to emphasize the need for solidity  in the
Tunisian market.  However, a better way to achieve this objective would be to require a higher solvency
margin, though still based on retained premiums.  As it is, a gross premium margin penalizes companies
that  resort  more  extensively  to  the  reinsurance  market.  To  protect  against  excessive  reliance  on
reinsurance  and  against the  practice  known  as "fronting",  whereby  a  local  insurance  company  acts
effectively as a broker for a foreign company, a minimum retention ratio of 50% could be used for the
calculation  of solvency margins.  This is the approach adopted  in the EU and now  spreading  in most
countries  in Latin America and Asia.
Liberalization  of Premiums
Insurance  regulation  has  traditionally  followed  two  distinct  approaches.  One  approach  has
emphasized the fixing of premiums at levels that are adequate to pay future claims and avoid insolvencies,
while the alternative approach has relied on solvency monitoring.  The first approach often involves high
premiums that are then partially rebated to customers, except for mandatory coverage in motor insurance
where most regulatory authorities tend to impose inadequate premiums that result in undenvriting  losses.
The  second approach  allows  insurance companies  to  set their  own  premiums  but relies  on  solvency
monitoring along the lines discussed above to discourage deceptively cheap policies.
The Tunisian regulatory authorities have the right to set minimum and maximum premiums and
to approve all new products and contracts.  However, except for the premiums for compulsory third party
motor  insurance, it appears that  insurance companies are free to  set their own  premiums.  In fact, as
already noted, ill advised competition in some lines tends to result in premiums that are too low to ensure
satisfactory profitability.
18There is a clear need  for a  liberalization  of motor insurance  premiums and their fixing by
insurance  companies  at levels  that would  ensure adequate  long-term  profitability. The industry needs to
expand its use of incentives  to reward good driving records  and to develop  a better monitoring of claims,
a  more effective control of car repairs, and a  more equitable system for the award of damages.
Eliminating,  or at least  substantially  reducing,  the cross-subsidization  that is currently  taking  place between
different lines  would increase  the profitability  of insurance  companies  and allow  more of them to list their
shares on the stock market.
Use of solvency  monitoring, and especially  introduction  of solvency  margins based on claims,
would discourage  the offer of excessively  low premiums  in motor insurance  as well as in other lines. In
addition, the authorities  could study a system  of "baremization"  that would put economically  meaningful
limits on court awards for personal  injuries  and loss of life. Such systems  are used in Canada  and Spain.
It should,  however,  be noted  that "baremization"  systems  are highly  complex  and complicated  instruments
that are difficult to get right.  They also require frequent revision and updating.  But despite their
limitations,  they may be a better alternative  than systems  where courts have no guidance  whatsoever  on
the appropriate level of awards.  A "baremization"  system may also encourage the use of arbitration
procedures  that would avoid the heavy costs of going through the courts.
Work Accident Insurance
As noted  above,  responsibility  for work accident  insurance  has been  transferred  as of the beginning
of 1995  to the social security  system. This represents  a step in the opposite  direction from the growing
reliance on the private sector.  It is regrettable that this transfer could not be avoided through greater
cooperation  between  the social security  system  and the insurance  industry  to promote  the use of nominal
policies.  The development of solvency margins based on  past losses could also have acted as a
disincentive  against offering  policies  with very low premiums  or inadequate  controls on the coverage of
employees. Although  some private companies  are not unhappy  to be relieved  of the burden of providing
work accident insurance,  the role of the social security institutions  in this area would need to be kept
under review  and the whole question  re-examined  when the insurance  industry  becomes  more robust and
more effectively  regulated.
Life Insurance and Social Security Reform
The promotion of life insurance  would be stimulated  by the implementation  of a fundamental
reform of the pension and social security  system. Although  such a reform  needs to be taken on grounds
concerned  with the adequacy  and inequities  of the existing  system  and would clearly not be motivated  by
the prospects  of life insurance  business,  there can be little doubt that establishing  a fully funded pension
pillar to complement  the existing partially funded scheme would have immense implications  for the
generation  of long-term  savings  and for the role  of insurance  companies  in managing  such  funds. Several
measures  can be taken to encourage  the growth of individual  capitalization  accounts  for the provision  of
supplementary  pensions. Recent  moves toward reduced levels  of social security pensions,  especially  for
high income employees,  suggest  that group life insurance  may receive  considerable  stimulus  in the near
future.
Tax Treatment
Insurance  business  is subject  to a bewildering  tax treatment  that involves  tax rates  that range from
a complete  exemption  for export  insurance  to 5% on aviation  and maritime  insurance  contracts  and as high
19as 24% for agricultural insurance.  Even compulsory motor insurance incurs tax at 12% while other motor
risks are taxed at  10%.  There does not appear to be any rationale in the structure of insurance taxes that
are levied on premiums paid.  A rationalization of the tax treatment would seem necessary.  This should
aim to bring the tax treatment of insurance in line with prevailing practice in the EU.
Enhancement of Financial and Technical Risk Management
At present, Tunisian insurance companies engage to a very limited in financial and technical risk
management.  Development of a sophisticated financial management function has been inhibited by the
requirement  to  invest a  substantial proportion  of available  funds  in nonmarketable and  low-yielding
government securities that used to be imposed on insurance companies.
To encourage insurance companies to develop their fund management expertise, investment rules
must set maximum limits for different types of securities for risk diversification purposes.  In addition,
insurance companies should be required to invest in marketable securities and other assets that have a well
developed secondary market and can therefore be liquidated without causing substantial price declines.
Limits on single and group exposures would be essential.  The valuation of investment assets should as
far as possible be based on market values and the frequency of reporting should be increased.
Investment  regulations  have  been  relaxed  in recent  years and  now  insurance companies  are
required to invest only 35% of their tezhnical reserves in government securities or in securities guaranteed
by the state.  There is also a 50% upper limit on corporate bonds, equities, real estate and bank deposits,
and a 5% limit on the equities and bonds of a single issuer.  Individual real estate properties are subject
to  10% limit, unless the property is used as a head office.  Claims on brokers and other receivables are
subject to a 30-day maturity limit and a  10% value limit in relation to premiums.
Some insurance companies belong to broader financial conglomerates.  Such groups should be
required to publish audited consolidated accounts and limits should be placed on  investments in group-
related companies.  Any dealings with related parties should be allowed only if they are effected at market
terms and conditions and should follow clear rules of reporting.
The need  for better  financial management is also seen  in the area of receivables from agents,
which represent a rather high level of premiums.  As in the case of banks, insurance companies need to
establish more effective monitoring systems and to take early steps to ensure the recovery of premiums
both from the insured and from the agents.
The development  of the technical risk management function has been inhibited by two factors.
First, the compulsorv  motor insurance line. which represents one-third of total business, has been subject
to  premium  controls,  leaving little scope to  insurance companies  to develop different  products  to fit
different classes of risks.  Second, the business of large industrial risks, which represents another one-third
of total business, has been based on premiums set by reinsurers to whom insurance companies cede 60-
70% of the risks (and the premiums) in order to avoid large losses. Thus, for two-thirds of their business,
Tunisian insurance companies have had little scope for premium setting and product innovation.
Liberalization of motor insurance and development of the capacity to retain a higher proportion
of large industrial risks would increase the scope for technical risk management.  Following the change
in the insurance code that introduced proportional coverage in cases of underinsurance, several insurance
20companies have started to offer professional advice to companies about the adequacy of their insurance
cover.
But the industry needs to develop further its actuarial capabi  ties and to compile more complete
and reliable  data on  loss experience.  There is also a need  to develop mortality  tables that cover  the
population of insured Tunisians.  Closer and more extensive technical cooperation of insurance companies,
perhaps under the aegis of the insurance association, would be helpful in this respect, although the  law
should ban any collusion on the setting of premiums or the introduction of new products.
Consumer Pkotection
The insurance code contains several provisions that aim to enhance the protection of consumers.
But some of these provisions threaten to have an inhibiting effect on the growth of the industry, either
by making more difficult the recruitment of agents and salesmen or by increasing the bureaucratic costs
of doing business.
With regard to the minimum professional qualifications, the authorities should consider relaxing
the recently ihtroduced criteria and allow staff with one year's  training and an aptitude to sell insurance
to  be  hired  as  salesmen.  Not  every  salesman  of  insurance needs  to  have  a  university  degree  in
mathematics and to be an actuary.  Provided the products are well designed and provided the salesforce
receives  adequate  back-office  support,  persons with  less extensive  education  but with  a  satisfactory
minimum amount  of training could be allowed to qualify.
The use of detailed forms that may be difficult to comprehend offers little protection to consumers.
The authorities  could  consider instead the creation of an  insurance ombudsman  office  that would  be
responsible for investigating consumer complaints and order insurance companies to settle disputes if the
complaints are justified.  Consumers should retain the right of redress through the courts.  The ombudsman
office could be operated under the aegis of the association of insurance companies.
Industry Dialogue
At  present,  it is  not clear  that  there  is a  sufficient  dialogue  between  representatives  of  the
insurance companies and the authorities.  A more effective dialogue could be promoted by the association
of insurance companies, which in any case needs to develop a more independent profile and to represent
the views of the industry.  The association may also undertake publicity campaigns to educate the public
in insurance matters and to  improve the public image of the industry.
Training Programs
The modernization  and development of the insurance industry would require a major effort  in
training that  should encompass not only actuaries, financial analysts, investment managers and  selling
agents, but also insurance supervisors and examiners.  There is already a well functioning insurance course
run by IFID, but this needs to be complemented with more intensive courses, especially for actuaries and
supervisors.  Allowing foreign companies to enter the Tunisian market will provide a major channel for
training local staff.  The training of supervisors and examiners should be based on closer cooperation with
supervisory authorities in OECD countries, especially the neighboring European countries.
21IV.  CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The insurance industry can play a very important part in the development of the private sector and
the modernization  of the  securities  markets.  At  present, the  industry is underdeveloped  because of
restrictive regulations, deficient capital, and a bad public image.  The industry has also suffered from the
structural adjustment of the economy.
To encourage the development of the industry and allow  it to play  its full part in stimulating
economic growth, a more conducive environment would be needed.  This would involve the creation of
a  contestable  but well  regulated  market, allowing  greater  freedom of  innovation and  competition  to
individual companies, but imposing an effective system of prudential regulation and supervision.  In this
respect, the following measures would seem appropriate and would involve a partial but extensive revision
of the insurance code.  These would generally engender a harmonization with insurance regulation in EU
countries.
*  Strengthening of insurance supervision, involving a more forceful and equal application
of corrective measures.
*  Restructuring and recapitalization of capital-deficient companies.
*  Privatization of state-owned companies.
*  Opening  of the Tunisian  market to majority-owned  foreign  firms or foreign  majority
controlled joint  ventures.
*  Stipulation  of  solvency  margin  in  relation  to  retained  premiums  (instead  of  gross
premiums) and introduction of solvency margins related to average annual losses.
*  Liberalization of premiums for the compulsory third-party coverage of motor insurance.
*  Study and possible introduction of "baremization" system that would put economically
meaningful limits on court awards for personal injuries and loss of life.
*  Re-examination of the decision to transfer responsibility for work accident insurance to
the social security system and introduction of nominal policies for this  line of business.
*  Consideration  of  reform  of  pension  system,  encompassing  the  creation  of  a
complementary capitalized pillar that would lead to the generation of long-term savings
and would transform the prospects for life insurance business.
*  Rationalization of the tax treatment of insurance premiums.
*  Enhancement of financial and technical risk management throughi further  relaxation of
investment rules and development of loss experience and mortality data.
*  Relaxation of professional qualifications for selling agents and creation of an insurance
ombudsman office to provide better consumer protection.
22*  Improvement of  industry dialogue  by  promoting  a  more  independent  association  to
represent the views of the industry.
*  Establishment of  major  training  programs,  not  only  for  actuaries,  financial  analysts.
investment managers and selling agents, but also for insurance supervisors and examiners.
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